

Safety-Critical Machine Learning: Development & Testing

Aman Sinha August 17, 2020

Motivation

We are starting to apply machine learning to high-stakes decision-making







- The standard paradigms of ML aren't enough in safety-critical applications
 - Development: minimize average loss over a nominal training dataset
 - Testing: check average performance over a test dataset

- New paradigms for handling uncertainty
 - Development: build robustness against uncertainties
 - Testing: quantify risk (likelihood and severity) of failures

Robustness

Build models with guaranteed performance over uncertainty sets




Risk



Robustness

Build models with guaranteed performance over uncertainty sets



Risk



Robustness

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
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- What about when \mathcal{P} is large/unknown?

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
Risk



$$\mathbb{P}_0(f(X) < \gamma)$$

Robustness

Build models with guaranteed performance over uncertainty sets



- With small \mathcal{P} , can we solve this quickly?
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Risk



- Why is this the right problem?
- How do we solve it quickly?

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Certifiable robustness against adversarial attacks


Sinha*, Namkoong*, Duchi. ICLR 2018. Sinha*, Namkoong*, Volpi, Duchi. Under review.







Certifiable robustness against adversarial attacks





[Goodfellow et al. 2015]

[Athalye et al. 2017]

We want to increase the robustness of ML systems to adversarial attacks (small \mathcal{P})

Current approaches

- Adversarial training heuristics: fast but no theoretical guarantees of robustness
 - Goodfellow et al. 2015, Kurakin et al. 2016, Papernot et al. 2016, He et al. 2017, Carlini & Wagner 2017, Tramer et al. 2017, Madry et al. 2018, etc.

- Formal verification: rigorous guarantees but slow
 - Huang et al. 2017, Katz et al. 2017, Kolter & Wong 2017, Tjeng & Tedrake 2017, Raghunathan et al. 2018

Our goal: balance efficiency with robustness guarantees

Our work: principled adversarial training


• Setup: model/network weights $\theta \in \Theta$, feature vector X, label Y, and loss $\ell(\theta; X, Y)$

Overall idea: replace $\ell(\theta; X, Y)$ with robust surrogate $\phi_{\gamma}(\theta; X, Y)$

- For moderate levels of desired robustness and smooth losses ℓ :
 - Provably fast convergence, 5-10x as fast as ERM
 - Statistical guarantees for performance on (perturbations to) the test set

• Goal: robustness to perturbations in a Wasserstein ball


• Generally intractable for arbitrary ρ



$$\underset{\theta \in \Theta}{\mathsf{minimize}} \ \mathbb{E}_{P_0}[\ell(\theta;X,Y)]$$

• Goal: robustness to perturbations in a Wasserstein ball


• Generally intractable for arbitrary ρ



$$\min_{\theta \in \Theta} \max_{Q} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{Q}[\ell(\theta; X, Y)] : D_{c}(Q, P_{0}) \leq \rho \right\}$$

Goal: robustness to perturbations in a Wasserstein ball

• Generally intractable for arbitrary ρ




- Lagrangian relaxation and its dual formulation
 - More robustness \leftrightarrow larger $\rho \leftrightarrow$ smaller γ

$$\min_{\theta \in \Theta} \max_{Q} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{Q}[\ell(\theta; X, Y)] - \underbrace{\gamma D_{c}(Q, P_{0})}_{\text{penalty}} \right\} =$$

• Compare to ERM: minimize $\theta \in \Theta$ $\mathbb{E}_{P_0}[\ell(\theta; X, Y)]$


$$\phi_{\gamma}(\theta; x_0, y_0) := \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \left\{ \ell(\theta; x, y_0) - \gamma ||x - x_0||^2 \right\}$$

Key insight: $(x,y)\mapsto \ell(\theta;x,y)-\gamma\|x-x_0\|^2$ is strongly concave for **smooth** ℓ and large enough γ




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
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
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
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Key insight: $(x,y)\mapsto \ell(\theta;x,y)-\gamma\|x-x_0\|^2$ is strongly concave for **smooth** ℓ and large enough γ

• Curvature in $||\cdot||^2$ dwarfs out non-concavity of $\ell(\theta;\cdot)$



Deep nets with smooth activations (ELUs, sigmoid, etc.) are smooth

Optimization guarantees

Algorithm: SGD for $\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{P_0}[\phi_{\gamma}(\theta; X, Y)]$

- Sample $(x^t, y^t) \sim P_0$
- Compute adversarial example: (approximate) maximizer \hat{x}^t of $\ell(\theta^t; x, y^t) \gamma \|x x^t\|^2$
- $\theta^{t+1} \leftarrow \theta^t \alpha \nabla_{\theta} \ell(\theta^t; \widehat{x}^t, y^t)$
- For large enough γ we can compute \widehat{x}^t in 10-20 gradient ascent steps
- Theorem: converges at standard nonconvex-SGD rate

Certificate of robustness

- Algorithm generalizes: we learn to prevent attacks on the test set
- $\theta_{
 m WRM}=$ output of Algorithm, $\mathfrak{Comp}_n=$ size of Θ , C= problem-dependent constant, $\widehat{P}_n=$ empirical training distribution

Theorem (Robustness Certificate)

With high probability, for any $\rho \geq 0$


$$\max_{Q:D_c(Q,P_0)\leq \rho} \mathbb{E}_Q[\ell(\theta_{\text{WRM}};X,Y)] \leq \gamma \rho + \mathbb{E}_{\widehat{P}_n}[\phi_{\gamma}(\theta_{\text{WRM}};X,Y)] + C \frac{\mathfrak{Comp}_n}{\sqrt{n}}$$

MNIST digit classification




MNIST classification

 Compare our method (WRM) with fast-gradient (FGM), iterated FGM (IFGM), and projected gradient method (PGM)




Test error vs. ϵ_{adv} for PGM $||\cdot||_2$ attack



Test error vs. ϵ_{adv} for PGM $\|\cdot\|_{\infty}$ attack

When the model misclassifies

Minimum perturbation forcing WRM to misclassify is perceptible



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Balancing safety & performance in high-uncertainty regimes

Sinha*, O'Kelly*, Zheng*, Mangharam, Duchi, Tedrake. ICML 2020.












Balancing safety & performance in high-uncertainty regimes

- When \mathcal{P} is large/unknown, balance is critical:
 - Conservativeness leads to poor performance
 - Aggressiveness is dangerous

- Autonomous racing is an extreme limit of autonomous driving
 - Strategies are secret
 - Crashing is expensive/dangerous (and makes winning hard)





Robust reinforcement learning

$$\underset{t}{\mathsf{minimize}} \sum_{t} \lambda^t \mathbb{E}[c(o(t))]$$

Robust reinforcement learning

• State-action transition probabilities P_{sa} , observations o, discount factor λ , cost c

Robust reinforcement learning

• State-action transition probabilities P_{sa} , observations o, discount factor λ , cost c

- ullet Overall idea: learn a useful parametrization for ${\mathcal P}$ and then proceed as before
 - Offline population synthesis: self-play to learn \mathcal{P} , a population of good racers
 - Online robust planning: robust belief-space planning against an opponent

Related work


- Robust RL/control
 - Robust MDP [Nilim & El Ghaoui 2005]
 - POMDP [Kaelbling et al. 1998]
 - Adversarial RL [Mandlekar et al. 2017, Pinto et al. 2017]

 Belief-space planning [Van Den Berg et al. 2011, Galceran et al. 2015, Kochenderfer 2015]

DRO [Namkoong & Duchi 2017]


Offline population synthesis

Goal: generate a diverse set of competitive agent behaviors




Policy parametrization

- Goal generator: neural net (IAF) weights θ
- Goal evaluator: nondifferentiable cost weights x




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


Search algorithm

 Employs self-play to generate competitive agents


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


• Described by their parameters (x, θ)

Step 1: initialize populations

Builds upon parallel tempering [Marinari & Parisi 1992]


• Initialize several "baths" of configurations (x,θ)



Step 2: self-play (vertical MCMC)

• Explore new proposals for x

 Evaluate each proposal by a race between the old and new configurations




Simulations happen asynchronously in parallel

teration

Step 2: self-play (vertical MCMC)


• Explore new proposals for x


 Evaluate each proposal by a race between the old and new configurations



Step 3: differentiable parameter update

• Optimize θ (neural network weights)






Step 4: configuration swaps (horizontal MCMC)

 Propose random swaps of configurations between adjacent baths


 Efficient way to encourage mixing because no new simulations needed




Step 5: update temperatures (annealing)


- Adaptive annealing scheme: adjust temperatures by annealing swapacceptance probability
 - Convex optimization problem


 Crucial in our setting because we don't have any prior knowledge of good race times (no priors for good temperatures)




End result: diverse population of opponent prototypes








Diversity in isolated laps




Diversity in maneuvering near an opponent


- When racing against an opponent, we maintain a belief vector $\boldsymbol{w}(t)$ of their behavior over the learned population of prototypes
- ${\cal P}$ is an uncertainty ball around this belief (χ^2 -divergence)



Draw candidate goal




Predict opponent behavior




Choose goal


$$c_1(t;g) := \sum_{s>t} \lambda^{s-t} \mathbb{E}[c(o(s);g)]$$




$$c_2(t;g) := \sum_{s>t} \lambda^{s-t} \mathbb{E}[c(o(s);g)]$$




$$c_3(t;g) := \sum_{s>t} \lambda^{s-t} \mathbb{E}[c(o(s);g)]$$




$$\max_{q:\sum_{i} w_{i}(\frac{q_{i}}{w_{i}})^{2} \leq \rho+1} \sum_{i} q_{i}c_{i}(t;g)$$






Repeat this for every motion planning goal and select the goal with the lowest robust cost




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



Belief updates (adaptivity)

- Update beliefs using the observed history of the opponent
 - Modified version of EXP3 [Auer et al. 2002]



Real-world experiments





Balancing safety and performance

Larger uncertainty sets (larger ρ) increase safety but decrease performance

Agent	$\%$ of iTTC values $<0.5\mathrm{s}$
$\rho/N_w = 0.001$ $\rho/N_w = 0.025$ $\rho/N_w = 0.2$ $\rho/N_w = 0.4$ $\rho/N_w = 0.75$ $\rho/N_w = 1.0$	$egin{array}{c} {\bf 7.86 \pm 0.90} \ & 6.46 \pm 0.78 \ & 4.75 \pm 0.65 \ & 5.41 \pm 0.74 \ & 5.50 \pm 0.82 \ \hline {\bf 5.76 \pm 0.84} \ \end{array}$

Increased safety with ρ

	Win-rate	
Agent	Non-adaptive	
$\rho/N_{\rm w} = 0.001$	0.593 ± 0.025	
$\rho/N_{\rm w} = 0.025$	0.593 ± 0.025	
$\rho/N_{\rm w} = 0.2$	$0.538 \pm\ 0.025$	
$\rho/N_w = 0.4$	$0.503 \pm\ 0.025$	
$\rho/N_w = 0.75$	$0.513 \pm\ 0.025$	
$\rho/N_w = 1.0$	$0.498 \pm\ 0.025$	

Decreased win-rate with ρ

Balancing safety and performance

Online adaptation regains the performance of aggressive strategies: Safe when uncertain, aggressive once the opponent is identified

Agent	Win-rate Non-adaptive	Win-rate Adaptive	p-value
$\rho/N_{\rm w} = 0.001$	$\boldsymbol{0.593 \pm 0.025}$	0.588 ± 0.025	0.84
$\rho/N_w = 0.025$	0.593 ± 0.025	0.600 ± 0.024	0.77
$\rho/N_{\rm w} = 0.2$	$0.538 \pm\ 0.025$	$0.588 \pm\ 0.025$	0.045
$\rho/N_w = 0.4$	$0.503 \pm\ 0.025$	$0.573 \pm\ 0.025$	0.0098
$\rho/N_w = 0.75$	$0.513 \pm\ 0.025$	$0.593 \pm\ 0.025$	0.0013
$\rho/N_w = 1.0$	0.498 ± 0.025	0.590 ± 0.025	0.00024

Key ideas of this talk

Robustness

Build models with guaranteed performance over uncertainty sets



- With small \mathcal{P} , can we solve this quickly?
- What about when P is large/unknown?

Risk

Find failure modes and quantify the probability of failure



$$\mathbb{P}_0(f(X) < \gamma)$$

- Why is this the right problem?
- How do we solve it quickly?

O'Kelly*, Sinha*, Namkoong*, Duchi, Tedrake. NeurIPS 2018. O'Kelly*, Sinha*, Norden*, Namkoong*. NeurIPS ML4H 2018.















Tesla Autopilot crashing in highway scenarios



- Certify a level of reliability
- Work with a blackbox algorithm

Related work

Formal verification [Kwiatkowska et al. 2011, Althoff and Dolan 2014, Seshia et al. 2015, O'Kelly et al. 2016]

• Falsification [Abbas and Fainekos 2011, Tuncali et al. 2016, DeCastro et al. 2018]

• Probabilistic falsification/Adaptive stress testing [Koren et al. 2018, Lee et al. 2018]

Problems with verification

 A "correctness" specification is subjective


Intractable


Requires white-box model



Problems with falsification

Not designed for coverage






• Goal: probability of dangerous event $p_{\gamma} := \mathbb{P}_0(f(X) < \gamma)$


• Base distribution of behavior $X \sim P_0$

• Objective function (i.e. safety metric) $f:\mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}$


Coverage of failure modes

Prioritization by likelihood







Components of the risk-based framework



Simulation



Generative models



Search algorithm

Search

$$p_{\gamma} := \mathbb{P}_0(f(X) < \gamma)$$

Random search (aka naive Monte Carlo)

$$\hat{p}_{\gamma} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} I\{f(x_i) < \gamma\} \qquad \mathbb{E}[(\hat{p}_{\gamma}/p_{\gamma} - 1)^2] = \frac{1 - p_{\gamma}}{Np_{\gamma}}$$


Estimate

Error of estimate

• Rule of thumb: need at least $100/p_{\gamma}$ samples for accurate estimate (error bars < 10%)

Search

Miles Needed to Demonstrate Failure Rates to a Particular Degree of Precision



[Kalra & Paddock 2016]

Key ideas of this talk

Robustness

Build models with guaranteed performance over uncertainty sets



- With small \mathcal{P} , can we solve this quickly?
- What about when \mathcal{P} is large/unknown?

Risk

Find failure modes and quantify the probability of failure



$$\mathbb{P}_0(f(X) < \gamma)$$

- Why is this the right problem?
- How do we solve it quickly?

Techniques for rare-event simulation

O'Kelly*, Sinha*, Namkoong*, Duchi, Tedrake. NeurIPS 2018. Sinha*, O'Kelly*, Duchi, Tedrake. Under review.











- Explore: draw samples from current sampling distribution
- Exploit: update sampling distribution



- Explore: draw samples from current sampling distribution
- Exploit: update sampling distribution

$$P_0 = \mathcal{N}(0, I)$$




- Explore: draw samples from current sampling distribution
- Exploit: update sampling distribution


$$P_0 = \mathcal{N}(0, I)$$

$$f(x) = -\min(x_{[i]})$$

$$\gamma = -6$$




- Explore: draw samples from current sampling distribution
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Goal: find a good parametric importance-sampling distribution

- Explore: draw samples from current sampling distribution
- Exploit: update sampling distribution


Sampling family: $\mathcal{N}(\theta,1)$



Goal: find a good parametric importance-sampling distribution

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
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- Explore: draw samples from current sampling distribution
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
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
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Sampling family: $\mathcal{N}(\theta, 1)$




Downside: need to know a good parametrization of samplers

$$f(x) = -\min(|x_{[1]}|, x_{[2]})$$



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$$f(x) = -\min(|x_{[1]}|, x_{[2]})$$



 $\mathcal{N}(\theta,1)$ family fails catastrophically!


- Exploit: throw away worst samples and rejuvenate from the remaining good ones
- Explore: MCMC to sample from updated level

$$\mathbb{P}_0(f(X) < \gamma) = \prod_{k=1}^K \mathbb{P}(f(X) < L_k | f(X) < L_{k-1})$$

$$\infty =: L_0 > L_1 \ldots > L_K := \gamma$$

- Exploit: throw away worst samples and rejuvenate from the remaining good ones
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


Goal: decompose rare probability into a ladder of non-rare probabilities

- Exploit: throw away worst samples and rejuvenate from the remaining good ones
- Explore: MCMC to sample from updated level


$$\mathbb{P}_0(f(X) < \gamma) = \prod_{k=1}^K \mathbb{P}(f(X) < L_k | f(X) < L_{k-1})$$

Empirical $(1-\delta)$ -quantile This is level L_1




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
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
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
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
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
Random stopping time K

$$\hat{p}_{\gamma} = (1 - \delta)^K$$




Upside

No need to come up with parametric distributions



Downside

Doesn't use gradient information $\nabla f(x)$




Challenge: intermediate distributions don't depend smoothly on f

A smoother ladder towards failure

$$\rho_k(x) := \rho_0(x) \exp\left(-\beta_k \left[f(x) - \gamma\right]_+\right)$$
exponential barrier

$$Z_k := \int_{\mathcal{X}} \rho_k(x) dx$$



• Contrast with AMS $\rho_k(x) := \rho_0(x) \underbrace{I\{f(x) < L_k\}}_{\text{hard barrier}}$


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$$\mathbb{P}_{0}(f(X) < \gamma) = \mathbb{E}_{P_{K}} \left[\frac{Z_{K}}{Z_{0}} \frac{\rho_{0}(X)}{\rho_{K}(X)} I\{f(X) < \gamma\} \right], \qquad \frac{Z_{K}}{Z_{0}} = \prod_{k=1}^{K} \frac{Z_{k}}{Z_{k-1}}$$

We will estimate these

- A smoother ladder towards failure
- Exploit: determine the next β using current samples (kth distribution)
- Explore + optimize: utilize gradient-based MCMC to sample from (k+1)st distribution
- Estimate: compute Z_{k+1}/Z_k via bridge sampling




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
Choose β_{k+1} such that

$$\frac{Z_{k+1}}{Z_k} \approx \alpha$$

(quasiconvex problem)




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Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)


• Treat $-\log \rho_k$ as a physical energy potential and simulate the dynamics (ODEs)




Automatic tradeoff between exploration and optimization

$$\nabla \log \rho_k(x) = \underbrace{\nabla \log \rho_0(x)}_{\text{exploration}} -\beta_k \underbrace{\nabla f(x)I\{f(x) > \gamma\}}_{\text{optimization}}$$

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


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Use both sets of samples to compute an accurate estimate of Z_{k+1}/Z_k




Bridge sampling

• Use samples from neighboring distributions to estimate their ratio Z_{k+1}/Z_k

$$\frac{Z_{k+1}}{Z_k} = \frac{Z_k^B/Z_k}{Z_k^B/Z_{k+1}}$$

Use an auxiliary "bridge" distribution




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
Use an auxiliary "bridge" distribution



Problem:
Error depends on distance between distributions


Neural warping

- Error of bridge-sampling estimate depends on the distance between distributions
- Transform the space so they are closer ("warp" the space between them)




- Classical techniques: mean shift, affine scaling [Voter 1985, Meng & Schilling 2002]
- Modern ML toolbox: normalizing flows [Papamakarios et al. 2019]
- Bonus: warping helps HMC [Girolami & Calderhead 2011, Hoffman et al. 2019]


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
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
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
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


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Random stopping time K $\hat{p}_{\gamma} \approx \alpha^{K}$



Performance guarantees

- Theorem: Number of iterations $K \to \log p_\gamma/\log \alpha$ and $\mathbb{E}[(\hat{p}_\gamma/p_\gamma-1)^2] \le 2KD/N$
 - D depends on (warped) distance between consecutive distributions
- Computational cost is O(KN) simulations

	Cost	Error	
Neural bridge sampling	$N\log(1/p_{\gamma})$	$rac{\log(1/p_{\gamma})}{N}$	
Monte Carlo	N	$rac{1}{p_{\gamma}N}$	

Performance guarantees


- Overall efficiency gain of $O\left(\frac{1}{p_{\gamma}\log(p_{\gamma})^2}\right)$ over Monte Carlo

Relative advantage scales with rarity

	Time	Error	
Neural bridge sampling	$N\log(1/p_{\gamma})$	$rac{\log(1/p_{\gamma})}{N}$	
Monte Carlo	N	$rac{1}{p_{\gamma}N}$	

Experiments: rocket design

- Vertical landing of an orbital-class rocket (e.g. SpaceX Falcon 9)
- ullet P_0 is the model of wind gusts during flight (100 dimensions)
- f(x) is the distance from the center of the launchpad at landing



Rocket1: Boosters capable of 15% main thrust

Rocket2: Boosters capable of 10% main thrust


Bigger boosters are safer but mean smaller payloads

Experiments: rocket design

- Vertical landing of an orbital-class rocket (e.g. SpaceX Falcon 9)
- P_0 is the model of wind gusts during flight (100 dimensions)
- f(x) is the distance from the center of the launchpad at landing

MC/NB use 100,000 samples


True is MC with 50M samples



Experiments: rocket design


- Vertical landing of an orbital-class rocket (e.g. what SpaceX does)
- P_0 is the model of wind gusts during flight (100 dimensions)
- f(x) is the distance from the center of the launchpad at landing





Experiments: OpenAl CarRacing

- Challenging environment (pixels to actions)
- P_0 is the model for track generation (24 dimensions)
- f(x) is the score achieved





Compare 2 SOTA policies:

	Average Score (over 2M runs)
AttentionAgent [Tang et al. 2020]	903 ± 49
WorldModel [Ha & Schmidhuber 2018]	899 ± 46

Experiments: OpenAl CarRacing

- Challenging environment (pixels to actions)
- ullet P_0 is the model for track generation (24 dimensions)
- f(x) is the score achieved





Experiments

Relative mean-square error $\mathbb{E}[(\hat{p}_{\gamma}/p_{\gamma}-1)^2]$ over 10 trials


	Synthetic	MountainCar	Rocket1	Rocket2	AttentionAgentRacer	WorldModelRacer
MC	1.1821	0.2410	1.1039	0.0865	1.0866	0.9508
AMS	0.0162	0.5424	0.0325	0.0151	1.0211	0.8177
В	0.0514	0.3856	0.0129	0.0323	0.9030	0.7837
NB	0.0051	0.0945	0.0102	0.0078	0.2285	0.1218
p_{γ}	$3.6 \cdot 10^{-6}$	$1.6 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$2.3 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$2.4 \cdot 10^{-4}$	$\approx 2.5 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$\approx 9.5 \cdot 10^{-6}$

Neural bridge sampling outperforms other methods

Key ideas of this talk

Robustness

Build models with guaranteed performance over uncertainty sets



- With small \mathcal{P} , can we solve this quickly?
- What about when \mathcal{P} is large/unknown?

Risk


Find failure modes and quantify the probability of failure



- Why is this the right problem?
- How do we solve it quickly?


Future directions

Automating the development process



Future directions

Model governance more broadly



Future directions

Model governance more broadly

